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Abstract 
One job for theories of mental representation is to distinguish 
between different kinds of mental representation: beliefs, desires, 
intentions, perceptual states, etc. What makes a mental state a belief that p 
rather than a desire that p or a visual representation that p? Functionalism is 
a leading approach for doing so: for individuating mental states. 
 Functionalism is designed to allow that psychological states can be 
multiply realized. Mark Sprevak has argued that, for a functionalist account 
of psychological states to apply to creatures that are organised in a very 
different way to humans (call them Martians), the way a psychological state 
is functionally individuated has to be relatively coarse-grained (Sprevak 
2009). Psychological research might show that human beliefs are directly 
available to consciousness, that they are formed as the result of deliberate 
judgement, and so on, but theorists would be precluded from including 
these roles in their account of belief, if Sprevak is right. 
 The argument for coarse-grained individuation fails if we distinguish 
functionalism about what it takes to be a psychological state in general from 
functionalism about a particular state type such as belief. Functionalism 
individuates a psychological state like believing that p partly by reference to 
its relations to other psychological states: desiring that p, perceiving that p, 
intending that p, etc. Functionalist motivations do indeed suggest that 
Martians with a functional organisation and physical substrate quite unlike 
humans could have psychological states, but not that they should have states 
with the interrelated collection of functional roles to count as beliefs, 
desires, intentions, etc. Thus, theorists are not precluded from including 
functional relations to consciousness or deliberate judgement in their 
account of (human) belief, consistent with allowing that Martians would 
have their own collection of functionally interrelated psychological states. 
 Sprevak’s coarse-grained functionalism implies an implausibly 
liberal form of extended cognition. The point about functional interrelations 
allows us to avoid that conclusion without jettisoning functionalism (as 
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Sprevak suggests we should): records in a human notebook may not enter 
into the right interrelations with other human psychological states to count 
as beliefs; nor do they enter into any interrelations with Martian 
psychological states. Functionalism can therefore allow that Martians have 
psychological states while holding that few if any of the beliefs we humans 
have are, as a matter of fact, extended. 
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(1) Introduction 
 
How fine-grained or coarse-grained should functionalist specifications of mental states 
be?  Fineness of grain is a matter of how many and various the clauses are that appear in a 
functionalist specification of a particular mental state type. Both commonsense functionalism 
and psychofunctionalism admit of more and less fine-grained variants. A very fine-grained 
version of functionalism could have the consequence that no actual organisms other than 
humans have beliefs. That would still be compatible with one functionalist intuition, namely 
that psychological categories are neutral about the substrate in which they are realised. 
However fine-grained, a functional category could in principle be realised in a substrate other 
than carbon. 
 
There is, however, a second prominent motivation for functionalism – a motivation 
that does seem to be undermined by individuating mental states in a very fine-grained way. The 
intuition is that we ought not to be too anthropocentric in characterising what it takes to have 
psychological states. That motivates functionalism, because functional specifications are less 
parochial and more apt to be realised by a range of different organisms. The octopus, which 
engages in complex and seemingly intelligent behaviour, has a very different way of organising 
information and generating behaviour (Godfrey-Smith 2016). The hypothetical intelligent 
Martian could be just as different from humans in its way of organising information and 
generating behaviour, and while also being based on a different substrate. Nevertheless, we 
should not rule out that octopuses and Martians have mental states. This motivation is thought 
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to suggest that functionalist specifications should be relatively coarse-grained, so that they can 
apply to creatures that are very different from us. 
 
The second motivation for functionalism has played an important role in underpinning 
the extended mind hypothesis (Chalmers 2008, Clark 2008, pp. 88-9). It also has wider 
significance, because it raises the question of how we ought to individuate psychological states 
in general and beliefs in particular. Even if our primary interest is not in the possibility of 
cognitive extension, the broader question of how to individuate beliefs turns partly on whether 
it is appropriate to individuate them in a coarse-grained or a fine-grained way. 
 
Within the extended mind literature, Clark has argued that the claim that mental states 
extend into the world beyond the skin is based on functionalist specifications of cognitive states 
like belief being relatively coarse-grained (2007, p. 167). He also argues that this way of 
individuating mental states is supported by commonsense psychology (2008, p. 88). Sprevak 
has turned these arguments into a purported reductio of functionalism. He argues that 
functionalism implies an unacceptably liberal form of cognitive extension (Sprevak 2009). Any 
functionalist treatment of mental states that is coarse-grained enough to apply to Martian 
psychology, as functionalists intend, will also count as cognitive the information contained in 
many of the artefacts with which humans interact, like the hard disk of your computer. 
 
This paper questions that argument. Section (2) argues that beliefs are individuated by 
reference to other human psychological states. Section (3) sets out the kind of Ramsey 
sentences that define human psychological states and those that define Martian psychological 
states. A resource that would count as psychological because of its relation to other Martian 
psychological states, for example an external notebook, does not thereby qualify as falling 
under any psychological category when a human interacts with it. The anti-parochialist 
motivation for functionalism is therefore consistent with psychological states being individuated 
in a relatively fine-grained way. I conclude that the argument that functionalism entails radical 
extension fails. 
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(2) Functionalism Connects Belief with other Human Psychological 
States 
  
Some have argued that there are conditions on a state’s being a belief which limit the 
ambit of cognitive extension.1 For example, maybe beliefs have to be readily and fluidly 
integrated with one another so as to allow continuous checking for consistency, in a way that 
semantic memories are but entries in notebooks are not. Such additional constraints would 
foreclose the problematic consequence that every informational resource with which a human 
interacts is part of her extended mind (Rupert 2004, 2009). Sprevak argues that that move is 
unavailable to the functionalist who is motivated by the intuition that Martians too have 
psychological states, since such fine-grained conditions would not be satisfied by Martian 
mental states. Sprevak rejects radical extension and embraces the modus tollens: functionalism 
about cognitive states is untenable. 
 
However, it is important here that we distinguish what it is to be a psychological state 
in general from what it is to be a psychological state of a particular kind, like a belief. Humans 
have beliefs, desires, hopes and intentions; visual perceptions, auditory perceptions and 
sensations like pain; anger, happiness, fear; and so on. One central concern of psychology is to 
characterise each of these psychological states; that is, to say how they are to be individuated. 
The subject matter, then, is the psychological states found in humans. This is not to presuppose 
that only humans can have them. It is an open empirical question whether other animals share 
any psychological states with humans – a question which turns in part on how such states are to 
be individuated. It could turn out that many other animals have beliefs, and that other primates 
have concepts, say. The target of this enquiry is the collection of psychological states that we 
humans happen to have, not those (if any) that are proprietary to humans. 
 
Another important, less empirical, question asks what it takes for there to be mental or 
psychological states in general. There the target is not the class of psychological states that 
humans happen to have, but the class of possible psychologies, which may be much wider. 
Possible psychology includes other ways that an organism could be set up to have some 
psychological organisation or other. In addressing that question we should not presuppose that 
the inventory of mental states found in humans is the only possible psychological organisation. 
                                                      
1  Clark and Chalmers (1998); from the opposite perspective: Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008). 
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Maybe there are quite different ways of processing information so as to respond flexibly and 
intelligently to the environment. 
 
What does it take to have some form or other of psychology, cognition or mental life? 
Considerations that seem relevant include that the organism engages in consistent and complex 
forms of behaviour that are responsive to features of its environment; that it pursues and 
achieves goals that are relevant to its interests; and that it processes information in rational or 
intelligent ways. The question is related to debates about the ‘mark’ of the mental, although 
there the focus is the form of psychological life exemplified by humans. To disambiguate we can 
use ‘psychological’ as the more general term and reserve ‘mental’ for the categories of human 
psychology. Consciousness is a candidate but contentious mark of the mental but it is unlikely 
all states that count as psychological are conscious. Intentionality is also contentious in this 
respect, both because is unclear whether all human psychological properties exhibit 
intentionality (e.g. moods, emotions on some views), and because many prima facie non-
psychological artefacts seem to have intentionality. These are difficult questions, and it is in any 
event not the aim of this paper to give an account of what it takes to have psychological states. 
The important claim is that the class of possible psychological states may be much wider than 
the collection of psychological states that humans happen to have (even granting that some 
human psychological states may turn out to be instantiated more widely, for example in other 
animals on Earth, with which we share common ancestors). 
 
A particular kind of mental state, like a belief, is individuated by its functional relations 
to stimuli, behaviour and other psychological states. A plausible constraint is that the ‘other 
psychological states’ figuring in a functionalist specification should be drawn from the same kind 
of psychology as the state in question; for humans, from the inventory of other human 
psychological properties. So human beliefs will be type-identified partly in terms of their 
relations to human desires and human intentions. Similarly, Martian mental states will be 
individuated by reference to Martian mental state types. Although it is widely recognised that 
functionalist specifications should include relations to other mental states – that’s what sets 
functionalism apart from behaviourism – a potential restriction to states from the same 
psychological system (either human or Martian, not both) is less widely noted. 
 
 A functionalist can hold that a Martian has psychological states without being 
committed to the Martian’s having beliefs (or any of the other types of mental states 
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instantiated by humans). Human mental states are individuated by a set of functional relations 
between perception, memory, belief, desire, intention, language processing, and so on. 
Martian mental states are individuated by a set of functional relations amongst the (different) 
collection of categories that characterise Martian psychology. In both cases the constitutive 
interrelations may be fine-grained. 
 
(3) Different Sets of Ramsey Sentences 
 
 Human psychological states are implicitly defined by sets of Ramsey sentences (Lewis 
1972). So are Martian psychological states. These sets of Ramsey sentences will generally be 
separate. We should not have to appeal to roles in Martian psychology to implicitly define the 
properties that figure in human psychology. So different psychological terms will figure in each 
set. 
 
Human psychological states are functionally defined in terms of inputs, outputs, and 
beliefs, desires, intentions and other psychological states (Psy1, Psy2, …): 
 
bel p = f (bel p’, des q, intention x, Psy1, …, stimulus1, …, behaviour1, …) 
des q = f’ (bel p, des q’, intention y, Psy2, …, stimulus2, …, behaviour2, …) 
… 
 
We then follow the Ramsey-Lewis method to give a functional characterisation of all human 
psychological types at once in terms of their interrelations.2 Functionalism says the same 
process is available to characterise Martian psychology, but functionalism need not be 
committed to Martians having the same collection of interrelated mental state types. So the 
specifications that enter into a functionalist treatment of Martian mental states (MPsy1, 
MPsy2, …) need not mention any human psychological categories: 
 
MPsy1 = g (MPsy2, MPsy3, …, stimulus 1, …, behaviour1, …) 
MPsy2 = g’ (MPsy1, MPsy3, …, stimulus2, …, behaviour2, …) 
… 
                                                      
2  Wadham (2016) points out that belief may be a cluster or prototype concept, based on having a 
sufficient number of relevant properties. Then the definition will be more complex, where 
some conditions are not individually necessary but certain conjunctions of them are. 
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 We should distinguish between two different kinds of Martian. Martians* are very like 
humans in the fine-grained functional organisation of their psychological processing, but that 
processing happens to take place in a radically different substrate – silicon perhaps. Here the 
intuition is that such creatures would operate in all relevant respects, both internally and 
externally, just like humans (although perhaps on a different length- or timescale). An intuition 
of substrate-neutrality underpins the conclusion that Martians* have beliefs, desires, 
perceptions, working memory, and all the rest. 
 
The second anti-parochial functionalist intuition discussed above motivates a second 
kind of case, Martians**. Martians** have a quite different psychological set up. Here a 
difference in substrate is irrelevant. The functional organisation of Martians** is unlike anything 
humans have ever known. For example, the way they organise and process information may be 
radically different. Nevertheless, they seem to act purposively, pursue long-term projects, deal 
effectively with changing environmental contingencies, build tools and artefacts, communicate 
with each other, work together in complex social organisations, and so on. Their psychology is 
so alien that we humans would never be able to empathise with them or see the world as they 
do. Still they do seem to have a psychology, to behave on the basis of inner psychological states. 
The octopus may be a real-life example of our hypothetical Martian**. It shares our organic 
substrate, but our last common ancestor with the octopus was some relatively simple probably 
worm-like organism that almost certainly did not have beliefs (Godfrey-Smith 2017). Yet we 
have the strong sense that octopuses are intelligent, with some kind of interesting if very 
different form of psychological organisation; that is, that they have psychological states. 
 
We can distinguish two potential intuitions about Martians**: that they have 
psychological states and that they have beliefs. Granted that we set up the case so that 
Martians** seem to have a psychology of some kind, is it also plausible that they have beliefs? It 
may seem unlikely that a psychofunctionalist specification of what it is to believe that p would 
extend to Martians**, but what about commonsense functionalism about belief? Commonsense 
functionalism was designed with anti-parochialist motivations in mind (Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson 2007) and this is the form of functionalism relied on by Clark in the extended mind 
debate (Clark 2008, p. 88, 240). But even commonsense functionalism appeals to interrelations 
between various mental states, for example between belief, desire (as opposed to drives or 
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hedonic states) and intention. There is no reason why this interrelated collection of mental 
states should mark the bounds of the psychological. 
 
So the more secure anti-parochialist motivation for functionalism implies that 
Martians** have psychological states, not that they have beliefs, desires or any other human 
mental state. Martians** do not then imply that the functional specification of beliefs must be 
drawn broadly. They show only that any functionalist characterisation of what it is to be a 
psychological state must be sufficiently broad to include the set of fine-grained relations 
amongst Martian psychological states exhibited by Martians**, as well as the (very different) set 
of fine-grained relations amongst human psychological states exhibited by humans. 
 
The distinction between psychofunctionalism and commonsense functionalism need not 
align with the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained functional specifications. A 
Ramsey sentence that tied belief to just a single non-commonsense psychological category 
would be psychofunctionalist but coarse-grained. A Ramsey sentence that posited complex 
interrelations between beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptual states, emotions, sensations, 
moods, memories and sentence meaning, for example, would be commonsense and fine-
grained. Our question is about fineness of grain. 
 
 We saw above that both Clark and Sprevak rely on the idea that a motivation for 
functionalism – that Martians could have mental states – suggests that functional specifications 
will be sufficiently coarse-grained so as to apply to some actual human informational resources 
outside the skin. Consider the well-known case of Otto, who uses entries in a notebook as a 
way of remembering addresses. Sprevak envisages a Martian with a storage and recall system 
inside its head that works like Otto’s notebook (2009, p. 508). He argues that functionalism 
entails that the notebook is cognitive in both the Martian and the human (Otto) case. However, 
the functionalist intuition that the Martian is a cognitive agent could at most entail only that the 
notebook falls under one of the categories of Martian psychology, e.g. MPsy1. A state in the 
Martian’s internal notebook of functional type MPsy1 could stand in the right relations to the 
other states of Martian psychology to count as a psychological state of some kind. But it does 
not stand in the right functional relations with human beliefs, desires, intentions and so on to 
count as a human belief, since it does not stand in any causal relations with human psychological 
states. A fortiori, it does not stand in the right functional relations with human psychological 
properties to qualify as any other kind of human psychological state. 
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 Now consider the notebook of the human, Otto. Nothing in the case speaks against 
human beliefs being individuated by relatively fine-grained functional roles, in which case the 
notebook does not stand in the right relations to human psychological states to satisfy the 
functional definition of any of them (the functions f, f’, … above). That would be so whether 
or not the notebook was internal or external to Otto’s skin. Nor does it stand in the right 
relations with MPsy2, MPsy3, etc., to count as a Martian cognitive state (the functions g, g’, … 
above), since it is not, by hypothesis, causally connected to any states of Martian psychology at 
all. So functionalist treatments of particular kinds of human psychological state (belief, desire, 
etc.) do not licence the conclusion that the notebook contains beliefs; nor do functionalist 
treatments of particular Martian mental states licence the conclusion that the (human) Otto’s 
notebook contains any Martian-type mental state. 
 
 In short, the possibility of a Martian** psychology in which interactions with a 
notebook were integrated with other Martian** psychological states in such a way that states of 
the notebook count as states of Martian** psychology would not immediately have the 
consequence that states of (human) Otto’s notebook are psychological states of any kind. Both 
Otto and the Martian** have the right kind of functional organisation to fall under the very 
general kind, psychological system. Otto’s psychology is human psychology, which may well 
individuate beliefs in a sufficiently fine-grained way that states of the notebook do not count as 
beliefs (e.g. because they are not sufficiently fluidly integrated with the rest of Otto’s beliefs). 
Martian** psychology has a different inventory of psychological states, by reference to which 
the Martian**’s notebook counts as an instance of state MPsy1**, say. That does not imply that 
human Otto’s notebook states are instances of MPsy1**. They are not causally connected to the 
other MPsy** states by which MPsy1** is individuated. 
 
 Whether things fall out that way depends upon three issues: how human psychological 
states are to be individuated; how Martian** psychological states are to be individuated; and 
what it takes to fall under the general category of being a psychological system. Those issues are 
where the hard work needs to be done to decide if there are any actual examples of cognitive 
extension. In particular, as is widely recognised, the answer will depend on how coarse- or 
fine-grainedly human psychological states ought to be individuated. My aim here is not to argue 
against the extended mind hypothesis, but to resist the argument that a major motivation for 
functionalism entails radical cognitive extension. That argument does not go through once we 
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recognise that the states in a psychological system are functionally defined by reference to causal 
relations to other states drawn from the same kind of psychological system. Intuitions about the 
psychological states of organisms with a very different functional organisation from ours – with 
a very different psychology – therefore get no grip on external resources with which humans 
interact. 
 
 We could instead consider a Martian that matched the fine-grain psychology of human 
belief, desire, etc., but who also had a notepad as an extra internal resource, interacting with 
beliefs, desires, etc. in the same ways, functionally, that Otto’s external notepad interacts with 
his beliefs, desires, etc. If the functionalist intuition were to require us to count the Martian’s 
internal notepad as cognitive, that would indeed entail that Otto’s external notepad is 
cognitive. But does functionalism entail that the Martian’s internal notebook is cognitive?  The 
fact that it is located inside the Martian’s head cannot be determinative, on a functionalist 
treatment (Wheeler 2010a). Treating him as a Martian*, we conclude (rightly) from the 
similarity in his internal organisation that he has beliefs, desires, etc. But that says nothing about 
whether his notebook is a resource that meets any of these fine-grained specifications of human 
psychological states. 
 
To answer that question we need an account of what it takes to be a belief (where belief 
is one of the psychological state types instantiated by humans, and possibly other species). 
Again, that question is where the action takes place. Notice that it will not be enough to have an 
independently-motivated locationally-uncommitted account of what it takes for a state to be 
cognitive in general, as some have argued (Walter 2010, Wheeler 2010b). That will just tell us 
what it is for an arbitrary collection of interrelated functionally-defined states to count as 
cognitive – a test that applies to a whole organism and its full inventory of states. That states of 
a notebook could count as psychological within some functional organisation or other does not 
yet show that they count as psychological when causally related to the categories of human 
psychology (belief, desire, intention, etc.). That still depends on how coarse-grained or fine-
grained the right functionalist characterisation of beliefs should be. 
 
A final question is whether, even if they are not beliefs, states of Otto’s notebook fall 
under some other psychological state type. Maybe the advent of writing brings with it the 
appearance of new psychological categories. The written artefacts people interact with in the 
right way would then count as psychological, in the spirit of the extended mind intuition, 
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without falling under any of the psychological categories applicable to pre-literate humans 
(belief, desire, intention, etc.). Whether that is so depends on what it takes to be a 
psychological state, which I have not attempted to answer here. But notice that the conclusion 
would be less radical than the standard extended-mind claim that Otto has beliefs. We already 
rely on categories like diary, portable written record and electronic address book to explain patterns in 
human behaviour. Treating these systematically, a category like readily-accessible artefact-based 
memory could turn out to qualify as psychological, taking its place alongside semantic memory 
and episodic memory in explanations of human behaviour.3 This possibility does not entail that 
the category of belief must be functionally individuated in a coarse-grained way. 
 
(4) Conclusion 
 
So we return to the question which is widely-recognised to lie at the heart of the 
extended mind debate: whether there are extra conditions on a state’s being a belief which limit 
the ambit of cognitive extension (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008), 
foreclosing the problematic consequence that every informational resource with which a human 
interacts is part of her extended mind (Rupert 2004, 2009; Sprevak 2009). That debate cannot 
be resolved by a general argument that the motivations for functionalism require coarse-grained 
functional specifications of categories like belief, pace Clark and Sprevak. Functionalism 
remains a viable ontology of mental states, and the fate of ‘extended functionalism’ (Clark 
2008) turns on whether external information resources have the kinds of connections to the 
rest of human psychology that would, whether they were located inside or outside the skin, 
make them count as a belief, a desire, an intention, or any other particular type of human 
psychological state. 
 
The fineness-of-grain question is important for functionalism in general, not just for 
those interested in the hypothesis of extended cognition. The anti-parochialist motivation for 
functionalism would seem, at first glance, to motivate a relatively coarse-grained way of 
individuating psychological states. But that does not follow. We need to differentiate between 
functionalism about what it takes, in general, to have a collection of psychological states that 
amount to a psychological system, and functionalism about what it takes to be a belief. A fine-
grained way of individuating beliefs is compatible with a functionalism that counts organisms 
                                                      
3  There is an issue about whether these would be psychological states of Otto or of the hybrid 
system consisting of Otto-plus-notebook (Miyazono 2017). 
12 | P a g e  
 
with quite a different functional organisation, and without beliefs, as also being psychological 
systems, and hence as having psychological states of their own kind. 
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